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FINAL REPORT OF TICOM TEAM 2

Ticom 77-41

This is the final report of TICOM Team 2 and associated individuals on the exploitation of the INNSBRUCK and PILSEN area.

TICOM
5 July 1945

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Final Report of TICOM Team 2, 9 May 1945 to 5 July 1945.

1. Personnel.

The Original team consisted of the following:

Major CHARLES J. DONAHUE, AUS (chief TRO)
Captain THOMAS M. CARTER, IC (Deputy Chief)
Lt. HUGH A.L. COCKERELL, RNVR
Captain LESLIE W. LAWRANCE, IC
Captain HENRY C. BARRINGER, AUS
Captain JAMES K. LIVELY, AUS
1st Lt. ARTHUR J. LEVENSON, AUS
P/O IAN C.M. MAXWELL, RAFVR
Cpl. J.W. BIGGIN, w/t operator
L/Cpl. J. TYLER, w/t operator
Cpl. RALPH H. BRAZEL, driver
T/5 FREDERICH MUZER, driver

The following changes in personnel were arranged in the course of operations:

16 May: Levenson set out from Berchtesgaden for U.K. as part of guard with prisoners and trucks containing "Fish" equipment.

18 May: Carter and Cockerell detached to Team 1, F/Lt. SAYRES detached from Team 1 to Team 2. Reason: to add personnel capable of interrogating in German to Team 2 and personnel with knowledge of machinery to Team 1.

22 May: Major MCINTOSH detached from Team 1 to Team 2 as special interrogator for the Pilsen prisoners. Biggins left at Berchtesgaden to operate VALET in accordance with TICOM orders.

26 MAY: Sqd. Leader STACEY and 2 RAF w/t operators joined team at Konstantinovy Lazne at order of TICOM.

1 June: Stacey left team and proceeded by air to U.K., TICOM approval by phone.

4 June: McIntosh left for U.K. by air. TICOM orders.

7 June: Barringer, Lawrence, Maxwell left for U.K. Brazel and the 2 RAF w/t operators returned to their proper stations.

8 June: Sayres returned to U.K.

13 June: Lively relieved at Revin by Lt. Norland of Team 1. Muzer returned to proper station.

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2. Equipment.

Team 2 was equipped as follows:

- (a) TICOM office and photographic equipment.
- (b) and (c) 2 sets of w/t equipment supplied by SCU-8.
- (d) 1 1½ ton personnel carrier.
- (e) 1 jeep.
- (f) 1 1-1/4 ton trailer.

On July 5: (a) returned to TICOM, (b) and (c) returned to SCU-8, (d), (e) and (f) returned to S.I.D. ETOUSA.

3. Principal tasks were:

(a) 14 May to 17 May inclusive: assistance rendered to Team 1. This included the location of Boetzel and Andrae at Landau north of Dorf-gastein through information obtained from Hepp by Lawrance, the preliminary interrogation of Boetzel by Lawrance (with Rushworth from Team 1), arrangements for fueling and getting under way the Diesel trucks with the "Fish" equipment made by Barringer. Further assistance rendered by the rear detachment of Team 2, Carter and Cockerell, who remained with Team 1 is included in report of Team 1.

(b) 18, 19, 20 May. Fruitless search for personnel of GAF Signals Regiments 350 and 351. This mission was undertaken at the suggestion of Team 1 who had been informed by Friedrich that Regiment 351, an intercept unit covering western traffic, was in the Innsbruck area and that Regiment 350, a cryptanalytic unit, had been ordered to Imst.

In the immediate area of Innsbruck there were no PW cages and no German troops at large. G-2 VI Corps and T-Force VI Corps knew nothing of GAF Regiments 350 or 351.

A unit overtaken near the Imst area would have to be either in one of the PW cages in the area or in the valley to the south in the vicinity of Pfunds where a considerable number of German troops were living under their own officers. At Imst, Military Government, CIC, and G-2 44th Division were visited as was the 44th Division PW cage. A large PW cage at Garmisch was investigated and the American authorities and the ranking German officer, an Air-Force Oberst, interviewed. There were no signal personnel at all in the camp. At Pfunds the search was started by a visit to the VI Corps Liaison Group with AOK 19. The valley was methodically combed including the upland villages where many of the Germans were living. In Pfunds, Oberleutnant Lehwald, who had acted as liaison officer between intercept units and the IC of AOK 19 was interviewed. In Kreidt, we talked to Oberst von Knau, air liaison officer with AOK 19; in Toesens to the Feldkommandant, an Oberst, and a lieutenant of the Nachrichtenkompanie ZBV 8; at Fiss to a lieutenant of Luft-nachrichtenkompanie 200. All these officers seemed willing to give information, but all denied that they had ever heard of any personnel of GAF Signal Regiment 350 or 351 in the area. It was ascertained that there were no Germans in the Pilz or Oetz valleys farther to the east.

The general conclusion from these investigations plus the information on the actual fighting in the area we got from American officers was that GAF Regiment 350 had never got to the Imst area at all or that they had been able to put on civilian clothes and disappear. Later in Konstantinovy Lazne, Team 2 obtained further information about the address of 2/LN Regiment 350 in March 1945. This information was signaled to TICOM.

(c) 21 May. Exploitation of Marinedruckvorschriftverwaltung, Innrain Strasse 9, III, Innsbruck. Report on target attached as enclosure 1.

(d) 23 May to date. Screening, interrogation, guarding, transport of personnel of Kommandeur der Nachrichtenaufklaerung 1, sigint unit of Heeresgruppe Mitte.

Phase 1. 23 May to 28 May inclusive. Team sent to V Corps, Pilsen, by TICOM order and reported to Col. Cleaves, Corps Signal Officer. Col. Cleaves gave the team the original reports on Kona 1 produced by the 16 Armored Division (extracts appended as enclosure 2) and directed them to Konstantinovy Lazne where the prisoners were being held in the division cage. Major Roland, G-2 16 Armored Division provided facilities for screening the 350 prisoners. All documents had been destroyed. Since all details learned would have to come from the memories of the prisoners, it was decided to select a group of considerable size, so that details forgotten by one prisoner could be supplied by another. All operational personnel were interviewed and originally 41 were selected for further interrogation (names appended in enclosure 3). In general the prisoners seemed anxious to supply information. At Konstantinovy Lt. Boeffler wrote the report on Russian cryptographic systems (TICOM/I-3) which, extended by later interrogations, forms the basis of the material already issued in TICOM/I 19d. Lt. Woellner and Lt. Soess wrote the account of the operations of the unit in the period immediately preceding the end of the war (enclosure 4). Despite the fact that the division released immediately all those prisoners not selected who lived in the Anglo-American zone, the prisoners selected for further interrogation seemed flattered and some of those released disappointed. The division was anxious that we should get our prisoners away as soon as possible, and the fact that one of our prisoners was shot and wounded by a Czech while he was held in the division cage emphasized the advisability of removing them. The wounded prisoner was left behind with another prisoner from whom we felt we had obtained as much information as possible. Arrangements were made for forwarding them if we should want them later. On 29 May, 39 prisoners were taken in division transport to Oberursel.

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Phase 2. 30 May to 2 June. There was a somewhat difficult stopover at Oberursel where the team housed the prisoners in an unused cage, procured rations for them on a meal to meal basis, and guarded them 24 hours a day. Fortunately, it was possible to keep the prisoners in a cheerful and consequently informative mood. They found the situation ausgezeichnet and produced at Oberursel the bulk of the documents which formed the basis for later interrogations. These documents have already been translated and published in TICOM/I 19b, reports 1--8, 18, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27--30. The original version of Heimann's report on T.A. (TICOM/I 19f.) was also written here. All the documents were group efforts. The names attached in the TICOM I reports are those of the group leaders. Through the efforts of Major Zaharias of 12 Army Group a permanent location for the prisoners was found with 6824 D.I.C. at Revin, France. They were moved there in trucks provided by 124 R.I. Company.

Phase 3. 3 June to date. 6824 D.I.C. put at the disposal of the team excellent arrangements for housing and further interrogation of the prisoners. Henceforth, the team's task was to provide liaison with 6824 D.I.C. and guidance to TICOM specialist interrogators. From 5 June to 10 June, Major Owen and Captain MacIntyre worked with the prisoners with a view to getting more specific information on the subjects handled in a general way in the Oberursel documents. Documents reported in TICOM/I 19b, reports no. 9--17, 22, 23, 26, were produced under their direction. Finally, Lt. Col. Pritchard, Dr. Pickering, Lt. Col. Neff, Major Grant, and Capt. Lowe, after a study of the documents, visited Revin, 14 to 20 June, clarified dubious points and obtained additional material, after which Pritchard and Pickering published TICOM/I 19a--g.

CHARLES DONAHUE,

Major, Sig. C.

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Authority: [unclear]
By: [unclear]

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4. enclosures:

- 1) Report on MOK Sued DV, Innrain Strasse, Innsbruck.
- 2) Extracts from reports on Kona 1 by interrogation team attached to 16 Armored Division.
- 3) List of Kona 1 Prisoners Taken to Revin.
- 4) Operations of Kona 1 in the Period Immediately Preceding the End of the War.

Enclosure 1.

Report on MOK Sued DV, Innrain Strasse, Innsbruck.

Target: Marineoberkommando Sued Druckvorschriftverwaltung,
9/III Innrain Strasse, Innsbruck.

TRO's: Lively, Sayres, Barringer, Maxwell, Donahue, Lawrence

Date of Exploitation: 21 May, 1945.

The four-storeyed building at 9 Innrain Strasse was originally a school conducted by Ursuline nuns, and was taken over by the Wehrmacht. The convent, still occupied, adjoins the school. Apart from the naval establishment on the third floor, other German installations had had offices there. On the ground floor there was an RAD office. The first and second floors, as well as the portions of the third floor not occupied by MOK Sued DV were used by an Entlassungsstelle. A fourth floor served as an attic. The whole building, including the cellars and air raid shelters was searched. There were five locked safes. These were opened by a pair of Austrian safe-crackers supplied by the American police via the American Military Police. The ashes of a fire where the documents had been burned were found outside one of the air-raid shelters. A thorough job had been done. The few legible documents clearly belonged to the Entlassungsstelle. They were turned over to Military Government.

German Personnel: The Mother Superior of the Ursuline Convent supplied some details on the history of the building. Joseph Arens, a former civilian employee of the Entlassungsstelle living on the third floor, was questioned but supplied no information of value.

The Target: MOK Sued DV occupied four rooms on the third floor:

- No. 75, apparently a store room. It had a barred door, and contained a considerable number of naval documents, most of them simply training manuals and unclassified.
- No. 74, apparently used for repairing cryptographic equipment.
- No. 73, apparently the main office.
- No. 72, apparently the orderly room.
(see diagram)

Condition of Target: Target was in a seriously disturbed condition. The Hitler Jugend had occupied the building briefly but violently after the Wehrmacht had moved out. Then, and during the first days of the American occupation of the city, there had been looting. Documents and machinery had been further damaged by a mysterious fire which broke out in room 75 shortly after the American occupation of the city. The ceiling had been burned through, the floors charred, and the equipment damaged by fire and water. The other rooms were not affected.

Assessment of Target: No evidence of any cryptanalytic work was found. Primary task of the installation seems to have been distribution and control of all sorts of printed matter and equipment, including code and cipher documents and devices.


- Materials found:
- 1) Code books, Schuesselblaetter, and Hefte in room 75. Upon orders from TICOM, 4 copies of each, when available, were taken.
 - 2) A considerable number of what appeared to be one-time pads in charred and water-soaked condition. These were not classified. A substantial number of the more legible ones were removed. In room 75.
 - 3) A total of approximately 50 E-Machines labelled "Schuessel M" in rooms 75 and 74. Sets of wheels for these machines were taken.

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- 4) A quantity of receipts indicating distribution of keys was found in room 73 and brought along.
- 5) On the ground floor of the building -- not in MOK Sued DV's area -- a number of discs classified Geheime Kommandosache which seemed to be cipher discs were found. One of each type was taken.


Disposition: All material taken at target was labelled and packed in a chest together with the floor plan of the MOK Sued DV rooms. The chest was left at Berchtesgaden on 22 May for forwarding to U.K. by air.



Marineoberkommando Sued-Druckvorschriftverwaltung

9/III Innrainstr., INNSBRUCK

Not drawn to scale



Enclosure 2.

Extracts from reports on Kona 1 by interrogation team attached to 16 Armored Division.

SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT

19 May 1945

TO: AC of S, G-2, 16th Armored Division.

I. COMMANDANT SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE 1. (Kommandeur Nachrichten Aufklaerung 1.)

A. GENERAL. This unit was in charge of monitoring Russian radio communications for tactical and strategic information. The results were passed on to the German Army Group Middle.

B. HISTORY. About 1928 a former Admiral of the White Russian Fleet began working for the German High Command on a plan for monitoring Russian Army messages, breaking codes, and building up OB information. The program remained in an experimental state until the outbreak of the Russo-Finnish war, when the German High Command employed its monitoring stations at Koenigsberg, Warsaw and Berlin to gather OB information about the Russian Army. During the French campaign in 1940 part of the unit moved to the West to monitor British broadcasts, but since August 1940 the headquarters had been in Lancut, Poland.

C. ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH. Commandant Signal Intelligence 1 was reorganized as follows:

<u>Regimental Headquarters</u>	5 Officers	16 EM
<u>Signal Intelligence</u>		
<u>Evaluation Unit No. 1</u>	6 Officers	260 EM (Approx)
Interpretation Section		
Message Receiving Section		
Evaluation Section		
Dissemination Section		
Air Force Section		
Statistical Section		
<u>Signal Intelligence Co No. 623</u>	3 Officers	272 EM (Approx)
Interpretation Section		
Message Receiving Section		
Evaluation Section		
Dissemination Section		
<u>Signal Intelligence Co No. 617</u>	3 Officers	250 EM (Approx)
Organization similar to No. 623		
<u>Stationary Monitoring Unit X</u>	3 Officers	250 EM (Approx)

Organization similar to Nos. 623 and 617 except that a good portion of the personnel consisted of women. This unit was mainly engaged in searching for Russian Military Broadcasting Stations above 35 kilocycles. Once a station was located the Signal Intelligence Co took up the monitoring. Extremely busy channels were also watched by Stationary Monitoring Unit X.

D. FUNCTIONS OF SUB-UNITS

The Interpretation Section broke code keys and translated messages.

The Evaluation Section was subdivided into the following units:

- a. Radio traffic, radio nets and call signs.
- b. Evaluation of message texts.
- c. Location of enemy radio stations by means of direction finders.
- d. Final evaluation of all information gathered.

The Message Receiving Station was engaged in copying all Russian Radio messages.

The Dissemination section passed on the information and kept liaison with lower and higher units.

The Air Force Section concerned itself only with air communications and locations of enemy airfields by means of radio traffic and location of enemy broadcasting stations.

The Statistical Section kept a complete card system on all information obtained.

In addition to the above approximately 10 teams were continuously on detached service with line units monitoring for tactical information.

E. PERSONALITIES.

<u>Regimental Headquarters</u>	CO	Maj. Herzer
	Adj.	1st Lt. Dickopp
	S-3	1st Lt. Walter Habenicht
Inspector of vehicles & Sig Corps equipment		Oswald Muehlana
Chief Paymaster		Franz Mommers

<u>Sig Intel Eval Unit No. 1</u>	
Commandant	Capt Roessler
CO	2nd Lt Werner Menzel
	1st Lt Wellnar
	1st Lt Chemnitz
	2nd Lt Polt
	2nd Lt Schwarz

<u>Sig Intel Co No. 623</u>	
CO	1st Lt Pfeiffer
	2nd Lt Sidler
	2nd Lt Poganski

<u>Sig Intl Co No. 617</u>	
CO	1st Lt Deutsch
	2nd Lt Weineck
	2nd Lt Volkmann

<u>Stationary Monitoring Unit X</u>	
CO	1st Lt Knaus
	2nd Lt Boskamp
	2nd Lt Loeffler

F. REPLACEMENT UNIT. The Signal Reserve and Training Bn 40-Schwarzenborn This unit later moved to Eschweger where it was completely destroyed by U S Third Army troops. ...

/s/ HENRY WAGNER
/t/ HENRY WAGNER
Capt. A.G.D.
IPW No. 141

SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT

22 May 1945

TO: AC of S. G. 2, 16th Armored Division

COMMANDANT OF SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE 1. (Kommandeur der Nachrichten Aufklaerung 1.)

Further interrogation of personnel revealed the following additional information as well as some corrections of statements made in Special Interrogation Report dated 19 May 1945.

Name: It was confirmed that the correct name of this unit is Commandant of Signal Intelligence 1. (Kommandeur der Nachrichten Aufklaerung 1.). PWs explained that this strange name was chosen merely in order to avoid specific authorization from the German High Command for activation of a new regiment, which would otherwise have involved a great deal of red tape.

Documents: The full facts of the surrender of this unit were explained by the Commandant, Maj. Ernst Hertzner. The remnant of the regiment--approximately 700 officers, Enlisted Men and Women, first contacted American troops on 9 May 1945 in the vicinity of Tausing, where they were directed to a PW enclosure at Stift Tepl. They had destroyed almost all of their papers except those that they considered most essential for reconstruction of their records. These documents were kept in three brief cases plus one book. In the afternoon of the 9 May, while rumors were circulating in the PW enclosure to the effect that the Russians were moving into the area, the contents of the three brief cases were burned. The book, however, remained in one of the vehicles but a minute search of that car failed to produce it.

The unit arrived with from 5-10 radio receivers. One has been located. (See below under "Equipment") ...

Organization and Personalities.

General of Signal Intelligence (General der Nachrichtenaufklaerung)	Col. Boetzel
Commandant of Signal Intelligence 1 (attached to Army Group, middle)	Maj. Ernst Hertzner
Commandant of Signal Intelligence 2 (attached to Army Group North)	Maj. Zaerban
Commandant of Signal Intelligence 3 (attached to Army Group Kurland)	Lt.Col. Dr. Franz(?)
Commandant of Signal Intelligence 4 (attached to Army Group, Southeast)	(?)
Commandant of Signal Intelligence 5 (attached to Army Group G)	Capt. (or Maj.) Marquardt
Commandant of Signal Intelligence 6 (attached to Army Group on Northern sector of Western front)	Lt.Col. Herfurth (?)
Commandant of Signal Intelligence 7 (attached to Army Group Southwest)	Lt.Col. Seemueller
Commandant of Signal Intelligence 8 (attached to Army Group South)	Lt.Col. Hoepfner

Prior to October 1944, Commandant of Signal Intelligence 6 concerned itself with Partisan radio activities (France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, etc.) and with radio activities of enemy troops dropped behind German

lines. This function was then taken over by the General of Signal Intelligence because of the need for additional personnel for the expanding Western front.

According to PWs, the Commandants of Signal Intelligence were organized as follows:

Commandant of Signal Intelligence 1

- 2 Long Distance Sig Int Cos (Nos. 617 and 623)
- 1 Local Sig Int Co. (No. 954)
- 1 Stat Monitoring Unit (No. 10)

Commandant of Signal Intelligence 2

- 3 Long Distance Sig Int Cos. (Nos. 610, 619 and 622)
- 2 Local Sig Int Cos. (Nos. 951 and (?))
- 1 Stat Monitoring Unit (No. 6 or 7)

Commandant of Signal Intelligence 3

- 1 Long Distance Sig Int Co. (No. 611)
- 1 Local Sig Int Co. (No. unknown)
- 1 Stat Monitoring Unit (No. 3 ?)

Commandant of Signal Intelligence 4

- 2 Long Distance Sig Int Cos. (Nos. unknown)
- 1 Local Sig Int Co. (No. unknown)
- 1 Stationary Monitoring Unit (No. unknown)

Commandant of Signal Intelligence 5

- ? Long Distance Sig Int Co. (Nos. 626 and ?)
- ? Local Sig Int Co. (Nos. 953 and ?)
- 3 Stationary Monitoring units (Nos. unknown)

Commandant of Signal Intelligence 6

Organization unknown

Commandant of Signal Intelligence 7

- 1 Long Distance Sig Int Co. (No. 626)
- 1 Local Sig Int Co. (No. 956)
- 2 Stationary Monitoring Units (Nos. 1 and 4)

Commandant of Signal Intelligence 8

- 1 Long Distance Sig Int Co. (No. 620)
- 1 Local Sig Int Co. (No. unknown)
- 1 Stationary Monitoring Unit (No. unknown)

Radio Intercepting Cos. (Funk ["]Überwachungs Co.)

- No. 612 - watching or searching for spies in Reich itself.
- No. 614 - for the Eastern sector. This Co. is now known as Local Int Co. No. 966.
- No. 615 - for Yugoslavia and southern France.

Stationary Monitoring Unit No. 11 - for Russian NGWD (Russian Secret Police)

The numbers of the Long Distance Signal Intelligence Cos. run from No. 610 to 626 incl.

The numbers of the Local Signal Intelligence Cos. run from No. 951 to 966 incl.

The Stationary Monitoring units activated run from Nos. 1 to 11 incl.

Table of Organization and Actual Strength:

Commandant of Signal Intelligence 1		
	<u>T/O (KSTN 813/1942)</u>	<u>Act. Strength (as of 1 May 45)</u>
Officers	5	5
Enlisted men	17	13
Women	--	2
	<u>22</u>	<u>20</u>
Signal Intelligence Evaluation Unit 1		
	<u>T/O (KSTN 898/1942)</u>	<u>Act. Strength (as of 1 May 45)</u>
Officers	18	8
Enlisted Men	212	160
Women	--	50
	<u>230</u>	<u>218</u>
Stationary Monitoring Unit 10		
	<u>T/O (KSTN 894/1942)</u>	<u>Act. Strength (as of 1 May 45)</u>
Officers	6	3
Enlisted men	184	158
Women	--	73
	<u>190</u>	<u>234</u>
Long Distance Signal Intelligence Co. 617		
	<u>T/O (KSTN 865/1942)</u>	<u>Act. Strength (as of 1 May 45)</u>
Officers	8	3
Enlisted men	262	198
Women	--	3
	<u>270</u>	<u>204</u>
Long Distance Signal Intelligence Co. 623		
	<u>T/O (KSTN 865/1942)</u>	<u>Act. Strength (as of 1 May 45)</u>
Officers	8	4
Enlisted men	262	176
Women	--	4
	<u>270</u>	<u>184</u>
Local Signal Intelligence Co. 954		
	<u>T/O (KSTN 865a/1942)</u>	<u>Act. Strength (as of 1 May 45)</u>
Officers	5	5
Enlisted men	310	226
Women	--	--
	<u>315</u>	<u>231</u>

A break-down of the actual strength of the regiment reveals the following:

Commandant of Signal Intelligence 1			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
CO	1	-	-
Adj.	1	-	-
S-3	1	-	-
Paymaster	1	-	-
Technical Inspector	1	-	-
Clerks	-	4	2
Truck drivers	-	9	-
	<u>5</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>2</u>
Signal Intelligence Evaluation Unit 1			
	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Hq. Section	1	18	2
Evaluation Sect.	6	66	25
Cryptographic Sect.	1	42	-
Communication Ln. Plt.	-	21	23
Truck Drivers	-	13	-
	<u>8</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>50</u>

Stationary Monitoring Unit 10

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Hq. Section	1	18	2
Monitoring Plt.	-	32	61
Evaluation Sect.	1	25	8
Cryptographic Sect.	1	15	2
Communication In. Plt.	-	10	-
Truck Drivers	-	8	-
Enemy Radio Station locators	-	50	-
	<u>3</u>	<u>158</u>	<u>73</u>

Long Distance Signal Intelligence Co. 617

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Hq. Section	1	15	3
Monitoring Plts.	1	91	-
Evaluation Sect.	1	33	-
Cryptographic Sect.	-	20	-
Communication In. Plt.	-	23	-
Truck Drivers	-	16	-
	<u>3</u>	<u>198</u>	<u>3</u>

Long Distance Signal Intelligence Co. 623

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Hq. Section	1	14	4
Monitoring Plts.	1	83	-
Evaluation Sect.	1	34	-
Cryptographic Sect.	-	16	-
Communication In. Plt.	1	17	-
Truck Drivers	-	12	-
	<u>4</u>	<u>176</u>	<u>4</u>

Local Signal Intelligence Co. 954

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Hq. Section	1	41	-
Evaluation Section	-	30	-
Radio Receiving Section	-	25	-
Communication In. Platoon	-	18	-
4 Monitoring Platoons	<u>4</u>	<u>112</u>	<u>-</u>
	<u>5</u>	<u>226</u>	<u>-</u>

Equipment: Commandant of Signal Intelligence 1 employed the following German Signal Corps Equipment:

Receivers:

Tornister Empfaenger b	100 -	7000 Khz
Fu HEa	85 -	857 Khz
Fu HEb	857 -	3750 Khz
Fu HEc	3450 -	25000 Khz
Fu HED	25000 -	60000 Khz
Fu HEU	750 -	25000 Khz
Fu HEV	25000 -	200000 Khz

Tornister Empfaenger b was used once an enemy station had been located. Fu HEa, b, c, d were monitoring sets whereas Fu HEU and HEV were special sets for voice monitoring.

One set Fu HED has been located and is being safeguarded for further disposition.

This unit has been experimenting with a new method of locating and identifying enemy radio stations. A member of the unit invented a set which will optically identify each radio station by recording its individual wave characteristics. Part of this equipment is still available for study and should prove of great interest for US signal intelligence personnel.

* Editor's Note: The prisoner was Graul (No. 20 on list in Enclosure 3). He later denied having any equipment but said he could reconstruct it if given time and facilities.

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PW Count: The following personnel of this unit is assembled at PW cage No. 4, 16th Armored Division. Numbers in parenthesis indicate actual strength of unit as of 1 May 1945.

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Women</u>
1. Commandant of Signal Intell 1	5 (5)	13 (13)	2 (2)
2. Signal Intell. Evaluation Unit 1	8 (8)	94 (160)	36 (50)
3. Stationary Monitoring Unit 10	3 (3)	63 (158)	45 (73)
4. Long Distance Signal Intell. Co. 617	2 (3)	84 (198)	2 (3)
5. Long Distance Signal Intell. Co. 623	4 (4)	140 (176)	3 (4)
6. Local Signal Intelligence Co. 954	2 (5)	4 (226)	- (-)
	<u>24 (28)</u>	<u>398 (931)</u>	<u>88 (132)</u>

A listing of the military specialty of this personnel is attached.

(SIGNED)

HENRY WAGNER
 Capt AGD
 IPW 141

Enclosure 3.

List of Kona 1 Prisoners Taken to Revin.

1. Maj. Ernst Hertzer
2. Hpt. Roman Roessler
3. Oblt. Wilhelm Knaus
4. Lt. Heinz Boskamp
5. Harry Loeffler
6. Heinz Poganski
7. Oskar Schwarz
8. Klaus Weihe
9. Eduard Woellner
10. Insp. Georg. Berger
11. Oberwachtmeister Klaus Eickhoff
12. Friedrich Mueller
13. Waletr Roesler
14. Willy Schaefer
15. Walter Schuler
16. Uffz. Heinz Althanns
17. Karl Boehning
18. Herbert Buchal
19. Waletr Busse
20. Arno Graul
21. Wilhelm Heimann
22. Emil Herbst
23. Anatol Hesse
24. Joachim Krause
25. Werland Merlingen
26. Heinz Nebe
27. Franz Rzehak
28. Heinz Soethoff
29. Ruprecht Strothmann
30. Obgefr. Werner Gruetzner
31. Eugen Schaefer
32. Gerhard Scholz
33. Karl Ziebach
34. Gefr. Eberhard Bahr
35. Hans Haesen
36. Leonhard Huchting
37. Arved Klumber
38. Karl Oechsler
39. Georg Thomas

Enclosure 4.

Operations of Kona 1 in the Period Immediately Preceding
the End of the War.

By Lt. Eduard Woellner, Director of NAAS
Assisted by
Lt. Gottfried Soess, same unit.

The area covered by Kona 1 was in general co-extensive with the boundaries of the Army Group and included the following fronts: 2nd Ukrainian Front (except 46 Army and XXIII Tank Corps), 4th Ukrainian Front, and 1st Ukrainian Front. We operated beyond the boundaries of the Army Group only if the Army Group was especially interested.

2nd Ukrainian Front.

The Front included the following large formations: 46 Army (from Vienna, the left Front boundary to Hollabrunn), 7 Guards Army (up to the area south of Bruenn), 53 Army (up to the area west of Kromeriz), Army Group Smatschenko with the 1 Rumanian, 4 Rumanian, and 40 Army (up to the Vsetin area, the right front boundary). In addition the following mobile formations: 1 Guards Cavalry Army (finally in the Bruenn area), 6 Guards Tank Army (finally in the area east of Bruenn), II Guards Mechanized Corps (finally allotted to the 6 Guards Tank Army), XXIII Corps (finally in Korneuburg area) and IV Guards Mechanized Corps (finally in reserve).

At the beginning of May nets of the 7 Guards Army, 53 Army, Army Group Smatschenko, 1 Guards Cavalry Army, 6 Guards Tank Army, and II Guards Mechanized Corps were picked up.

Only the movements of the 6 Guards Tank Army and the 1 Guards Cavalry Army were of larger strategic interest. Their traffic to the rear with the Front High Command as well as forward to their subordinate corps was picked up. While they were operating near Bruenn, the locations of the brigades of the 1 Guards Cavalry Army could be constantly followed. The withdrawal of the 6 Guards Tank Army from the Vienna area and its regrouping into the Bruenn area to the right next to the 1 Guards Cavalry Army could also be recognised. On about 5 May the withdrawal of both armies was recognised. Renewed operation of the armies was not observed because we stopped covering on 8 May.

In the case of the rifle armies of the Front, local Schwerpunkte and single divisions could be recognised principally by close range sigint.

4th Ukrainian Front

The Front included the following large formations: 18 Army (from the Vsetin area, the left Front boundary, up to the area south of Misteck), 1 Guards Army (up to the Maehrisch-Ostrau area), 38 Army (up to the Ratibor area), 60 Army (up to the area east of Krnov, the right Front boundary). In addition XXXI Tank Corps (finally in reserve, before that operating with 60 Army).

18 and 38 Army were picked up at the beginning of May. The Front had no large strategic importance. Results on movement of Schwerpunkte and intentions to attack came chiefly from close range sigint (coverage of mortar and artillery formations). Strategic w/t traffic was always very sparse in the area of this Front. It was assumed that Baudot traffic was being passed.

TOP SECRET "U"

17.

1 Ukrainian Front.

The following large formations were established in the Front area: 59 Army (from west of Krnov, the left Front boundary, to Strehlen), 21 Army (to Liegnitz area), 6 Army (around Breslau), 33 Army (in the area west of Liegnitz), 52 Army and 2 Polish Army (in the area extending up to the east of Bautzen), 5 Guards Army (to the Elbe), 3 Guards Tank Army and 13 Army (west of the Elbe), and 28 Army (finally established south of Berlin). In addition 4 Tank Army (in the Waldheim--Doebeln area), 3 Guards Army (in the area east of Doebeln, adjoining 4 Tank Army on the left), IV Guards Tank Corps (operating in the area of the 5 Guards Army), VII Guards Mechanized Corps (finally operating near Bautzen), I Guards Cavalry Corps (finally operating near Meissen), XXV Tank Corps (finally established in Kottbus area).

This Front was the most important and had priority cover. Up to the last all formations were picked up in communication with the Front High Command. Nets for forward communication were picked up in the case of all formations except 59, 21, and 6 Army (stable front), and IV Guards Tank Corps, I Guards Cavalry Corps and XXV Tank Corps (all presumably not yet operating on 7/5).

After the Russians came up from the Neisse sector to attack Berlin and to establish contact with the Americans, the movements of the Tank Armies and mobile corps could be continually followed. The grouping of the Tank Armies was apparent on the afternoon of the first attack. The locations of the brigades of the 3 Guards Tank Army, for example, could be reported several times during the day.

After Berlin was taken, w/t traffic was reduced. On the occasion of the last attack on the Protectorate, operations and grouping of the 3 Guards Tank Army and 4 Tank Army on the right wing of the Front were spotted immediately at the beginning of the attack. The withdrawal of the two armies from Berlin to the south had been recognized previously, as was the bringing up of the rifle armies (13 Army and 3 Guards Army), which co-operated with the tank armies, into the area west of the Elbe. We had no important information on the rest of the Front sector at the time of the beginning of the last attack and the end of our operations, since the front had not yet begun to move. The old grouping could be continually confirmed.

All data are approximate and cannot be considered complete.